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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the spread of extremist groups can be 
curtailed throughout Northern Africa and, more specifically, how to stop Nigeria from 
becoming another Afghanistan.  This thesis will focus on how to engage an African 
government, specifically Nigeria, in order to help it engage in and develop the 
population. This thesis will demonstrate that one way to ensure the stability of weak 
states is to persistently provide security force assistance to the local government prior to 
the need to establish control over a populace through direct tribal engagement. 
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A. IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, boasts West Africa’s most powerful 
military, and is a major oil exporter to the West, in general, and the U.S. in particular.  
Yet, it has a relatively dysfunctional central government.1  Since independence, Nigeria 
has suffered from a significant gap between the state and society.  Literacy has fallen, the 
country’s ability to provide electric to the population has decreased, poverty has 
increased, and the divide between the rich and poor has widened.  The ethnic, religious, 
and socioeconomic diversity of Nigeria’s population, as well as its significance to the US 
economy, makes it a prime target for al Qaeda. Notably, in June and July of 2009, al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) sent its agents into Nigeria to assist the Boko 
Haram (Nigerian Taliban) group against Nigeria’s security forces.2   
Other external actors also seek to exacerbate on the state-society gap in attempts 
to further destabilize Nigeria’s government.  Two of the oldest Islamist movements in 
northern Nigeria receive outside support.  The Jama’atul Izalatul Bid’ah Wa’Ikhamatul 
Sunnah (Izala), a Sunni organization founded by the anti-colonial critic Sheikh Abubakar 
Gummi, currently receives financial aid from Sunni organizations in Saudi Arabia.  
Likewise, the Shia organization, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), founded by 
Malam Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, receives support from Iran.  These Nigerian organizations 
utilize this external funding as a means to recruit people to their cause and undermine the 
authority of the government by highlighting the government’s failure to maintain public 
social services. This further widens the state-society gap.3  These external forces,  
 
 
                                                 
1 Jonathan N. C. Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization? (Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2010),  2.  
2 Ibid.,  26. 
3 Ibid.,  25. 
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working against Nigeria, distract the government’s efforts to secure and improve 
Nigeria’s southern ports and oil producing region, further degrading Nigeria’s stability 
and productivity.4 
Nigeria is a nation that desperately needs stability in order to ensure its 
productivity and establish itself as a leader on the African continent. There has been 
much discussion about the effectiveness of tribal engagement in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In each of these theaters, tribal engagement took place after the state failed. 
In the post-Cold War era, states have been abandoned due to the realpolitik policy of 
letting countries settle their own affairs. In Afghanistan, once the Soviets withdrew, 
Afghans fought with one another leading to the government being taken over by the 
Taliban, an oppressive extremist group.5  With the end of the Cold War in sight, the need 
to stabilize Afghanistan seemed a waste of American time and assets. One consequence 
of U.S. neglect was the rise of the Taliban and a safe haven for al Qaeda.6  Can the US, 
and the world, continue to afford to make similar mistakes going forward?  History 
suggests that the wider the gap between a society and the state, the less to the state is able 
to ensure stability.7 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the spread of extremist groups can 
be curtailed throughout Northern Africa and, more specifically, how to stop Nigeria from 
becoming another Afghanistan.  This thesis will focus on how to engage an African 
government, specifically Nigeria, in order to help it engage in and develop of the 
population. This thesis will demonstrate that one way to ensure the stability of weak 
states is to persistently provide security force assistance to the local government prior to 
the need to establish control over a populace through direct tribal engagement. 
                                                 
4  Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?  12. 
5  Tamim Ansary, West of Kabul, East of New York: An Afghan American Story (Picador USA, 2003). 
6  Max Boot, "The Case for American Empire," Weekly Standard (October 15, 2001),  27–30. 
7  Raymond W. Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc, 1994),  211. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given accepted views about nurturing civil-military ties through Security Force 
Assistance (SFA), we propose the following research questions:  how can the U.S. help 
prevent Nigeria from becoming a failed state, and how can we help the government of 
Nigeria eliminate the ability of Islamist extremists, such as AQIM, to gain a foothold in 
Nigeria?  Second, will developing a host-nation’s ability to provide and sustain security, 
and establish and develop civic programs (schools, hospitals, etc.) through the training of 
military, police, and civic leaders help eliminate the spread of AQIM?  In answering 
these questions we assume that if the government of Nigeria is able to better address its 
population’s needs, AQIM will be limited in its ability to recruit Nigerians and/or 
conduct operations in Nigeria, and Nigeria will be able to secure its southern ports and 
oil-producing region. 
D. THESIS SCOPE 
The gap that develops between the goals of the state and the needs of society is 
one explanation for breakdowns in governmental control.  In order for Nigeria to ensure 
it does not become a failed state, it will need to close the state-society gap.  To close this 
gap, the government will need to meet the basic needs of the people.  Of the many 
alternatives that are available to the United States to help Nigeria meet its population’s 
needs, there are two options: to work in direct contact with the population to establish 
schools, hospitals, and security (via tribal engagement or its equivalent) or to work with 
the government to establish the government’s ability to provide for the civil needs of the 
population (via SFA).  
Currently, Nigeria is unable to meet the basic security, civic, and social needs of 
its people, leaving room for al Qaeda and other outside actors to take advantage of 
governmental shortcomings. It is important that the U.S. work with countries to counter 
al Qaeda as it attempts to spread its influence into Africa. Nigeria is Africa’s most 
populous country. It is diverse in languages, religions, ethnicities, and natural resources.  
It is vital that the United States continue to develop its partnership with Nigeria in order 
to not only help close its state-society gap, but counter attempts by al Qaeda and other 
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extremist groups to widen this gap and use Nigeria as a springboard. This thesis will 
highlight how Nigeria might be stabilized, with Nigeria’s stability in turn leading to more 
stability on the African Continent. 
1. Close the State-Society Gap  
While there is, and always will be, some gap between the state and its constituent 
society, levels of instability tend to reflect the degree to which portions of the population 
feel they are in disequilibrium with the policies of the state.8  Internal and external 
factors, both positive and negative, can influence the stability of a state. Internal factors, 
such as leadership and social values, can be directed and/or influenced by external events.  
Financial, humanitarian, military, and educational aids are all examples of external inputs 
that can be used intentionally to either widen or narrow the state-society gap. 
2. Partnership for Host Nation Development  
U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/SFA efforts should be focused in order to 
more effectively develop Nigeria’s military and civil authorities, consistent with 
Nigeria’s existing structure, goals, and traditions. Both indirect and direct support for a 
host nation’s development should focus on a strong national infrastructure.9 
3. Persistent Presence (FID/SFA)  
If the U.S. pursued a policy of persistent presence while conducting FID/SFA in 
Nigeria we could better focus our efforts on the needs of the country.  Persistent presence 
might, in some people’s minds, lead to the view that the United States is acting 
imperialistic.  But, even during the 18th and 19th centuries, the problem may not have 
been colonial rule per se, so much as the way in which the rule was conducted. England, 
and other European countries, never intended to relinquish control of their colonies; 
therefore, they did not think it necessary to plan for independence.  The turmoil that  
 
 
                                                 
8 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
9 Department Of The Army, FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (Washington DC: May 2009). 
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engulfs much of the third world today is, in part, a consequence of imperial selfishness 
followed by neglect; no one prepared Nigerians to take over and run their country 
effectively. 
E. METHOD 
Depending on the fit between external support and internal needs, four 
possibilities exist for outcomes: a strong state and weak society, a dysfunctional state 
ruling over an internally torn society, a pretense of democracy, or a representative 
government supported by a civil society.10  With each of these ‘state-society’ 
relationships, stability depends on the majority of the society accepting and internalizing 
that relationship as the norm.11  It is fruitless to establish an authority that is patterned 
after a totally foreign form of government simply because that form has worked in other 
places.  Care must be taken to establish governance that fits with the political culture that 
citizens want.  While it is understood that the antecedent conditions of African states and 
conditions the US has dealt with in other areas are quite different, nevertheless, stability 
relies on the ability of the state to meet the needs of a heterogeneous society.  
In order to demonstrate what we put forth in our thesis, we will conduct a survey 
of U.S. efforts that have been successful, Kosovo and El Salvador, as well as those that 
have not, Afghanistan (post-Soviet withdrawal).12 Kosovo will be used as an example of 
high external involvement in the establishment of government post-instability.  
Afghanistan, post-Soviet withdrawal, offers an example of no external involvement by 
the U.S.  The U.S. efforts in El Salvador exemplify instances of low cost involvement 
with a small, yet continuous, external support. 
                                                 
10 Mehran Kamrava, "Political Culture and a New Definition of the Third World," Third World 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1995),  691. 
11 Ibid.,  692. 
12 Steven Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1997). 
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F. CHAPTER REVIEW 
The chapter outline has been designed to first establish the need for stabilization 
in Nigeria and why Nigeria is important to not only Africa, but also the rest of the world, 
in particular the United States. Secondly, we establish historical examples where the U.S. 
has both failed and succeeded in stabilization operations throughout the world. Third, 
recommendations are put forth for Nigeria, as well as why specific recommendations 
would work.  The following is a breakdown of the chapters: 
1. Introduction 
This chapter identifies the problem, discusses the purpose and objectives, and 
identifies research questions answered in the thesis. Chapter I discusses the scope of the 
thesis as well as the methodology. 
2. History and Importance of Nigeria 
Chapter II discusses a brief history of Nigeria and identifies many Nigerian 
governmental challenges. These challenges include details about Nigerian military rule 
and the challenges of religion and politics. Specific security challenges of special interest 
to the United States include oil, foreign influences, and radicalization. Finally, Chapter II 
discusses the effects of prolonged instability on the Nigerian government and people.  
3. Case Studies  
Chapter III is a discussion of three chase studies in which the U.S. provided, or 
failed to provide, proper SFA and FID. El Salvador provides an example of an extremely 
small U.S. advisory group who were able to impact the country positively. Kosovo is an 
example of a large, high cost, multi-national intervention that has, to date, positively 
affected the region. Finally, Afghanistan demonstrates what happens with a lack of 
assistance after a destabilizing event, such as the Soviet withdrawal.  
4. Recommendations for Nigeria 
Chapter IV begins with a recap of the lessons learned from the case studies that 
apply to Nigeria. Next, the research questions are addressed along with the current 
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U.S./Nigerian relationship. Recommendations are made, based on both the lessons 
learned and the research questions, which are designed to ensure a persistent presence is 
maintained with the Nigerian government.  
5. Conclusion  
This chapter summarizes the entire thesis and reiterates the four main themes that 
were developed during the course of our analysis. 
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II. HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF NIGERIA 
A. NIGERIA GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960, but little preparation or 
historical knowledge was used to establish the post-colonial government.13 Prior to 1914 
Nigeria was not even a country, but a collection of kingdoms and governments, 
independent of influence from Europe. The establishment of Nigeria did not mean very 
much to the millions of people whose lives focused mainly at the local and tribal level. 
The vast majority of Nigeria’s problems, since independence, stem from the “National 
Question.” What is Nigeria? Who are Nigerians? How does a country go about 
developing a meaningful national identity?14 
In order to develop a plan for U.S. assistance to Nigeria, and to help it effectively 
deal with its security and trade issues, it is important to understand its history. There are 
at least 122 distinct tribes located within Nigeria, some of which are split by neighboring 
African countries. These tribes divide Nigeria into six major ethnic regions.15 When 
Europeans arrived on the scene, Nigeria’s tribes could be broken down into three broad 
categories according to their type of political control—large states, small states, and 
autonomous communities.16 While small states and autonomous communities existed 
throughout Nigeria, three large states emerged in the northern and western parts of 
Nigeria prior to western involvement.  
                                                 
13  Howard W. French, A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa, 1st ed. (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2005),  280. 
14 Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008),  158. 
15 George P Murdock, “The Traditional Socio-political Systems of Nigeria: An Introductory Survey,” 
in The Nigerian Political Scene, ed. Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 1962),  5. 
16  Ibid.,  9. 
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! 
Figure 1.   Nigerian Administrative Borders17 
Nigeria has been rife with wars and power struggles throughout its history. 
Geographic location and environment enabled some societies to develop into large states, 
while others to village-based system of government. Prior to European involvement, 
                                                 
17 Blasselle, International Crisis Group (August 2010). 
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trade with North Africa introduced Islam and the idea of Koranic law, and Nigerians have 
periodically fought over religion in some form or another since.18 The introduction of 
Christianity only added new dimensions to local religious tension.  
Between years 1731 and 1743 in the northwest part of Nigeria, known as 
Hausaland, the Fulani began to heavily proselytize on behalf of Islam.  Although locals 
had long been Muslims, the Hausa king established a series of anti-Muslim laws. Upset 
with the lack of strong Islamic leadership, a Fulani scholar named Usman dan Fodio 
initiated a holy war. By 1807, the Fulani army had brought most of Hausaland under its 
control.19 Many Nigerian Islamic fundamentalist groups refer back to this time as a 
justification for jihad and sharia law today.   
While European traders had been involved with the Niger Delta since the 15th 
century, direct contact and trade with the interior was practically none existent until the 
establishment of the British protectorate in 1885. Muslim armies had controlled the 
savannah and desert regions for centuries and so, when the British entered the interior 
they prohibited Christian missionaries from proselytizing in the Muslim areas. Without 
the ability to preach Christianity, missionaries did not provide any social or educational 
services to the areas either.  Centuries of the slave trade, forced conversions from 
traditional religions to Islam and Christianity, as well as the segregation of Muslims and 
Christians—in terms of education, jobs, and political structures—all aided in creating 
inter-Nigerian frictions.20 
With independence was on the horizon in 1950s, Nigeria was organized into three 
political regions. These regions were designed to give the northern Muslim population a 
region large enough to equal both southern regions combined, creating a north/south 
bipolarity. This exacerbated pre-existing fissures, as it lent the regions new political and 
economic significance.  The set-up was such that it ensured that the more educated, more 
                                                 
18  Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (Plymouth, Great Britain: Latimer Trend and Co Ltd, 
1962),  78. 
19 Ibid.,  86. 
20  For more information on the pre-colonial political structure of Nigeria read Robert O Tilman and 
Taylor Cole, ed. The Nigerian Political Scene (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1962). 
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affluent southerners could only beat the northern region politically if they worked 
together.21  Not surprisingly, perhaps, Nigeria experienced a coup just six years after 
independence.  
Nigeria’s leaders were never prepared for self-rule. Worse, those leaders placed in 
charge by the British were either delegitimized thanks to their service to Britain, or were 
not recognized as the legitimate leaders by the people.22 Hindsight gives us the ability to 
see that the process by which colonial powers ruled, and planned to continue their rule in 
Nigeria, helped set the stage for lingering turmoil.  
However, not all of today’s turmoil has its roots in colonial rule per se. Also 
worth considering is the way in which that rule was concluded. England, and other 
European countries, never intended to relinquish control of their African colonies; 
therefore, they did not deem it necessary to plan for independence. 
1. Military Rule 
After gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria established itself as a republic in 
1963. Then, in 1966, the military toppled the civilian regime in what was the first of 
many coups.23  In fact, differences in religion, regional, and ethnicity, as well as corrupt 
and incompetent leadership, led to a string of seven coup d'états and a bloody civil war 
(1967–1970) in which Eastern Nigeria tried to secede from the republic.  
In the 39 years between Nigerian independence and the restoration of Nigeria’s 
4th republic government in 1999, Nigeria had just over four years of civilian rule 
(between 1979 and 1984).24 Only with the 1999 elections did Nigeria experience a 
transfer of power between two civilians for the first time in its history. This transfer 
                                                 
21  Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?   4–5. 
22  Ibid.,  22. 
23 E. Ike Udogu, “Liberal Democracy and Federalism in Contemporary Politics” in Nigeria In The 
Twentieth Century,” ed. Toyin Falola (Durham NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002),  333. 
24  Ibid.,  334. 
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happened first in 2007 with the election of Umaru Yar'Adua, and again with the 
succession of power to Vice President Goodluck Jonathan in 2010.25 
2. Religion and Politics 
As mentioned previously, instability due to religious and ethnic divisions has 
plagued the region since pre-colonial times. The British continued and exacerbated these 
divides with their policies of separation of Muslims and non-Muslims in Nigeria.26 
British indirect rule relied on local authorities in each area to administer their own social 
system, rules, and laws. This, in turn, prevented missionaries from being able to spread 
Christianity in Nigeria’s north, which left functions such as education, medicine and 
social leadership to the ill-equipped Muslim authorities already in place.27  
As Muslim and non-Muslim communities began to compete for state resources, 
the earlier forced separation led to the politicization of both Islam and Christianity. For 
example, which laws applied (Islamic or secular) in cases where both Muslims and non-
Muslims were involved?28 In order to attempt to satisfy both Christians and Muslims, 
Nigeria was declared a secular state at independence. Yet, with the onset of political 
instability, Muslims who had accepted the secular state began to blame that same 
secularism for Nigeria’s many problems. Soon after independence, more religious 
leaders, both Christian and Muslim, began to form religious/political parties to influence 
the government.29  
Numerous Nigerian Muslims continue to believe that the secular nature of the 
state is the reason the government is corrupt and immoral. In their view, Islamic law 
would have never allowed for the military dictatorships that have all but ruined Nigeria.30 
                                                 
25  BBC News, “Obituary: President Yar'Adua” (BBC News, May 2010) Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6187249.stm 10 February 2011.  
26 Andrew E. Barnes, “Christianity and the Colonial State in Northern Nigeria 1900–1960,” in Nigeria 
In The Twentieth Century,” ed. Toyin Falola (Durham NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002),  281. 
27 Barnes, “Christianity and the Colonial State in Northern Nigeria 1900–1960,”  281. 
28  Ibid.,  287. 
29 April A. Gordon, “Ethnicity, Region, and Religion in Nigeria’s Political Culture,” Nigeria's Diverse 
Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook. ABC CLIO (2003), http://www.credoreference.com/entry/abcnigeria. 
30 Ibid. 
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In contrast, many Christian Nigerians believe that only a secular state can keep the 
country from again experiencing civil war, nearly destroying Nigeria. In their view 
religion as a basis for law would lead to an impossible system where every religion and 
minority could claim the precedence of its own local or traditional laws. In other words, 
why would Christians agree to be held to Islamic legal standards? Likewise, why would 
Muslims think they should abide by Christian preferences?31  
Today, Muslims and Christians have created movements and organizations to 
promote and “protect” their interests. Many of these groups promote a “them vs. us” 
mentality that has spread violence across the north. Christians openly criticizing the 
Quran and utilizing converts in their efforts to proselytize have enraged Muslims. 
Similarly, Muslims openly denouncing the Bible, and pointing to errors in it’s reasoning, 
have enflamed Christians.32 Violence and protests by Muslims against Christians for 
establishing churches in areas that had been off-limits to missions since colonial times 
have been answered by Christian violence in response to the re-establishment of Sharia 
law in the 12 most northern states in 2000.33 
B. SPECIFIC SECURITY CHALLENGES OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE 
U.S. 
1. Oil 
Arguably, Nigeria’s most significant region vis-à-vis its international relations, is 
the southern Niger Delta. Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the delta region 
in 1956. The region had been the center of trade in slaves, palm oil, and other exports 
since Europeans first arrived off the West African coast, but nothing transformed the 
region’s importance, economy, and way of life the way oil has.34 By the time of Nigeria’s 
independence, the Shell-BP Oil Company had acquired over 46 mining leases in the 
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region,35 and oil accounted for 80% of Nigeria’s revenue and 90% of its export 
earnings.36 With Nigeria so reliant on multinational actors to supply technology and 
production, it was limited to essentially being a collector of rent from big oil 
companies.37 That, along with the military takeover of the government in 1966, left the 
local landowners and traditional tribal authorities to feel robbed of any benefits from their 
oil-rich land.  
Putting this perceived theft into perspective, in January 2010, Nigeria had an 
estimated 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.38 In 2009, Nigeria produced 2.2 
million barrels a day, of which approximately 1.9 million were exported. Almost 40% of 
Nigeria’s exported oil was sent to the United States, making Nigeria the fifth largest 
foreign oil supplier to U.S. markets.39 However, years of political maneuvering by the 
central government along with nationalization of oil revenues (Petroleum Act of 1969) 
have only resulted in greater problems in the Niger Delta.  
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which was 
established in 2005 with the merging of several Niger Delta resistance groups, seeks the 
right for the oil producing communities to take part in Nigeria’s oil industry40 Today, this 
full-blown insurgent organization is responsible for the “shutting-in” of almost 40% of 
Nigeria’s oil industry through attacks, kidnappings, and terrorist activities.41 Between 
1999 and 2005, the Nigerian government claimed that loss of revenue due to attacks on 
the oil industry amounted to $6.8 billion. The Managing Director of Shell Nigeria has 
estimated losses to run as high as $61 million per day. In 2006, the Minister for 
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Petroleum Resources, Edmund Daukoru, estimated a loss of $16 billion a year.42 No 
matter which estimate is most accurate, Nigeria, a poverty-stricken country, is losing 
billions of dollars in its primary source of income due to persistent instability.  
The quality and quantity of oil being produced in Nigeria makes it an important 
oil supplier to the United States. Disruption of the oil flow from Nigeria directly affects 
refinery-buying practices, which, in turn, affects the world market.43 Instability in the 
region reflects an ever-widening gap between the state, which controls oil production and 
reaps most of the benefits, and citizens (to include locals) who live in poverty in a land 
full of resources. In the Delta in particular, the loss of traditional ways of life through 
decreasing fishing stock, decreasing arable land due to pollution, and contaminated water 
due to oil spills has gave rise to groups like MEND. Because of the combustibility of this 
region, Nigeria will not be able to contend with its many other security, stability, and 
corruption issues until the Niger Delta is stable. 
2. Foreign Influences and Radicalization 
Even if Christians had not moved into the northern Nigerian states, radical 
teachings from outside Nigeria would still pose a threat to Nigeria’s stability. Among 
northern Muslims, differences between reformists, traditional Sufi, and Wahabis already 
create tension and turmoil. Movements such as the Izala Movement, the IMN, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood consider Sufi sectarianism to undermine Muslim unity and therefore 
wish to eliminate Sufism from Nigeria. One reason these groups want to do this is they 
consider Islamic unity an important precursor to the inevitable clash with non-Muslims.44 
Consequently, Nigerian Islamists are able to attract international radical Islamist 
organizations to aid them in their fight, not only against Sufism, but also to establish a 
separate Islamic state in Nigeria.  
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The Izala Movement was begun in the 1960s, not long after independence45, and 
focused its efforts against local sultans and emirs who allowed pro-western ideas to creep 
into traditional Muslim portions of Nigeria. The founder of the Izala Movement, a 
Nigerian named Sheikh Abu-bakar Gummi, developed close ties to Saudi Arabia, ties that 
continue to provide significant material help to the organization today.46 
Although most Nigerian Muslims are not Shiites, the IMN is predominantly a 
Shiite organization. Malam Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, the founder of the IMN,47 was a key 
organizer in events that led to the implementation of Sharia law in 12 Nigerian states in 
year 2000, and has sought to bring about an Islamic revolution in Nigeria similar to 
Khomeini’s Iranian revolution. His outspoken support of Islamic revolution has gained 
him monetary support form Tehran. In 1990, the IMN split, with some Shiite leaders and 
a Sunni lieutenant forming the Movement for Islamic Revival (MIR), in open support of 
al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden. The two organizations nonetheless work together and 
are collectively referred to as the Muslim Brotherhood.48  
The most radical of Nigeria’s Islamist groups is the Boko Haram (Western 
Education Forbidden), or Nigerian Taliban, established in response to (and in support of) 
the installation of Sharia law.49 In 2009, Boko Haram, along with AQIM fighters from 
northern Africa, engaged local police in the northern city of Bauchi. The battle finally 
ended when the Nigerian Army engaged the Boko Haram compound, leaving an 
estimated 700–800 dead.50 In 2010, Boko Haram orchestrated a prison break in Bauchi in 
which it freed some 700 prisoners, with an estimated 150 of them being Boko Haram 
members. The group is also linked to a series of targeted killings in Maiduguri.51. 
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C. EFFECTS OF PROLONGED INSTABILITY 
With the existence of these Islamist groups in northern Nigeria, to include Boko 
Haram’s connection to AQIM, the stage is set for continued clashes with the Nigerian 
government, further adding to the potential for continued instability in the north as well 
as the Niger Delta. Thirty-six years of military rule, as well as persistent corruption in the 
government, has left many ordinary Nigerians (Muslims and Christians alike) convinced 
that protest and public disorder is the only way to be heard.52  
Nigeria’s dependence on oil exports as its single means of national revenue has 
led to a situation known as ‘Dutch Disease,’ in which its local currency is unrealistically 
overinflated, leading to lower demand for local agricultural products and commodities, 
since it is cheaper to import them.53 Dutch Disease, along with rapid demographic 
growth, has led to overwhelming poverty for the majority of the population, with over 
70% of the population living on just one dollar a day.54  
Not only does this inequality help explain Groups such as MEND, but also 
enables Islamist extremists in the north to attract followers. Both problems present 
serious challenges for Nigeria’s security forces. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To better understand the important role that Security Force Assistance (SFA) can 
play in assisting foreign militaries and governments address issues of instability, it seems 
critical to examine recent U.S. experiences: what led to U.S. involvement, and how did 
that involvement impact the host nation (HN).  
Throughout its history, U.S. Special Forces have spent the vast majority of their 
deployments conducting FID/SFA with a HN.  This chapter will briefly examine SF’s 
experiences in El Salvador, Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
B. EL SALVADOR 
El Salvador was a Spanish colony for over three centuries before El Salvadorans 
became disgruntled with Spain and declared their independence in 1821 along with five 
other Central American countries. To rule, the Spanish developed a centralized, 
hierarchal, and authoritarian government. 55 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries coffee production became El 
Salvador’s primary export.  The cultivation of this crop ultimately led to the alienation of 
communal lands, which were sold to private citizens and government officials.  The vast 
majority of the population was left without land of their own.56  The period between 
1925–1932 was a time of civil unrest and protest throughout the country. This unrest 
culminated in the 1932 rebellion and massacres of tens of thousands of mostly rural 
peasants.  General Hernandez Martinez took and remained in power until 1944.  From 
1944 to 1962, El Salvador was governed by the military, which ensured that the political 
system remained authoritarian.57 
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The United States began its first significant involvement in El Salvador between 
1962 and 1972, by supplying money and aid.  This period saw liberalization of labor, 
education and religion; furthermore, El Salvador began to moderate politically. However, 
liberalization began to be reversed between 1972 and 1976 because institutional access 
and competitive elections began to be closed down.58  Finally, in 1979, an unyielding 
group of junior military officers from the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) conducted a 
coup, removing General Carlos Romero, and took over the government, thus forming a 
Revolutionary Governing Junta to deal with social, economic and political problems.59  
By late 1980, the coup had led to civil unrest and the formation of the Marxist Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).  Civil war between the FMLN and the El 
Salvadoran government soon followed.60 
By 1981, the FMLN had developed a full-blown insurgency campaign throughout 
El Salvador.  In January 1981, under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. began to send a 
small number of Special Forces Soldiers to assess the situation.  Money, arms, and 
advisers were then sent to help support the El Salvadoran government; the footprint was 
limited to fifty-five Special Forces “trainers.”61  Additionally, the Ramon Belloso 
Immediate Reaction Battalion was trained at Ft. Bragg and a regional training center was 
opened in Honduras to supplement the advisors in El Salvador.  Training ranged from the 
tactical level up to the development of a National Military Strategy.62   
This partnership led to a persistent U.S. presence that lasted throughout the eight-
year civil war, as well as for the peace that followed.  The guiding principle for the 
overall mission was known as KISSSS, “keep it simple, sustainable, small and 
Salvadoran.”63  U.S. involvement was able to help the conflict with a very small U.S. 
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investment. Success is credited to several practices put in place early on. First, the U.S. 
stuck to its extremely small signature and did not make El Salvador a U.S. war.  Second, 
the U.S. was committed to staying the course. Third, U.S. advisors were not 
micromanaged and were able to link the military and political aspects of assistance 
vertically throughout the El Salvadorian government.64 This meant, among other things, 
teaching the military to subordinate itself to civilian leadership and changing the 
institutional climate in the military by rewarding competent officers.  Although this was 
not completely successful, positive changes were made.   
Serious peace negotiations began in the early 1990s, culminating in a final peace 
accord in January 1992.65 U.S. advisors in El Salvador learned they needed to understand 
the strategic impact of their actions as well as continue to find an El Salvadoran answer to 
El Salvador’s problem.66 Since 1992 El Salvador has remained more or less at peace.  
There has been some violent crime, but it appears to be decreasing, and political violence 
is almost non-existent. The FMLN has been integrated into the government and, in 2009, 
the FMLN’s candidate, Mauricio Funes, won the Presidency.  Although there are still 
high levels of poverty, the country’s economy has recovered from the civil war and has 
shown significant economic growth over the past decade and half.67  Since the end of the 
civil war, U.S. Special Forces have maintained a fairly continual presence in El Salvador; 
El Salvadorian forces have even deployed alongside U.S. SF Soldiers in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  In sum, El Salvador provides an excellent-arguably even a model for the 
importance of maintaining a persistent presence with a small footprint. Also noteworthy 
is the SF soldiers who served as advisors were mature, highly trained, and spoke the local 
language 
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C. KOSOVO 
To better understand Kosovo, it is important to understand the sources of tensions 
between the Serbians and the Albanians.  These tensions date back centuries: Thus, a 
brief overview history is in order. 
Kosovo is located in the Balkans between Albania, Serbia, and Macedonia; all 
three have played a significant role in its history.  The Kosovarian people trace their roots 
to the Illyrians, who at one time were under Roman control.  From about the ninth to 
eleventh centuries, Christianity spread throughout the region. In 1389, The Battle of 
Kosovo was fought between the Serbs, the Albanians, and the Ottoman Turks for control 
of the area. Even though the battle was technically a draw, the Serbs have been able to 
use it as a moral victory, and it has factored into their national identity ever since. It was 
during this period too, too, Islam spread throughout the region thanks to the Ottomans.  
For most of the next five centuries, the Ottoman Empire exerted influence and control 
over the Balkans, to include Kosovo.68  
In 1878, Serbia, along with Bulgaria, Romania, and Montenegro, became 
independent.  In 1908, the Young Turks came to power in the Ottoman Empire and could 
count on the support of both Serbs and Albanians (Christians and Muslims alike), at least 
initially.  However, this did not last long and instability led to the First Balkan War 
(1912–1913).  With the Ottoman Empire collapsing, Albania gained its independence in 
1912. 69  After the Second Balkan War (June 1913–July 1913), Kosovo was handed over 
to Serbia, not Albania, embittering the Kosovars.70  Between 1914 and 1918 heightened 
tensions resulted in a war between Serbia and Albania.  During this war over 100,000 
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revenge on the Albanian population by destroying villages and massacring civilians 
throughout Kosovo. Finally, in 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was 
proclaimed.71 
Having been split numerous times between the Serbs and Albanians, Kosovo 
became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.  In 1941, the Axis powers invaded 
Yugoslavia, and, from 1941 until 1944, Italian fascists occupied Kosovo.72   After WWII, 
Josip Broz, (also known as Tito) and his communist party took control of Yugoslavia.  
Knowing that there were significant ethnic and national conflicts throughout Yugoslavia, 
Tito ruled with an iron fist and suppressed national and ethnic identity.  Over time, Tito 
gradually loosened his grip and, in 1974, Kosovo’s status was upgraded to that of a 
constituent republic.  Tito remained in power until his death in 1980.73  Although the 
U.S. did not agree with Tito’s communist affiliation he was considered a renegade to the 
Soviets and the U.S. saw him as a counter to Stalin, at least in the Balkans.  After WWII 
and throughout the Cold War the U.S. supported Tito with military equipment and 
financial aid.74 
During the 1980s, communist regimes began to show increasing signs of strain.  
Yugoslavia was still a melting pot, with ethnic rivalries alive and well just below the 
surface.  In the late 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia, and in 1989 
revoked Kosovo’s autonomy.  Milosevic’s policies of preferential treatment for Serbs 
helped lead to the collapse of Yugoslavia and renewed tensions between Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo.   
In 1990, Kosovar Albanians demanded secession from Serbia, but not from 
Yugoslavia. Before this could happen, however, Croatia and Slovenia declared their own 
independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.  Heavy fighting broke out until a cease-fire was 
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negotiated in November of 1991, and in 1992, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) sent in peacekeeping forces to Bosnia.  In 1995, the Dayton Accords, which 
granted independence to Bosnia, did not include Kosovo.  This meant tension was found 
to continue through the early and mid 1990s, eventually turning violent between 1996–
1998.  Over 250,000 Kosovo Albanians were forced out of their homes, their businesses 
were looted and many were illegally detained, raped or executed.75 
In 1998, NATO was asked to begin planning for a resolution to the Kosovo 
situation.  Milosevic was given several ultimatums, but all were broken, and in March 
1999 NATO air strikes began, lasting until June.  United States Special Forces entered 
Kosovo in spring 1999, followed by over 30,000 NATO forces, to include 5,500 
American conventional forces to help maintain the peace.  U.S. Special Forces teams 
were dispersed throughout the U.S. controlled sector of Kosovo and dealt directly with 
security and governmental problems. A Special Operations Command and Control 
Element (SOCCE), part of Task Force Falcon, was responsible for synchronization and 
dispersion of Operational Detachments. Additionally, the SOCCE worked in coordination 
with a Special Operations Command Europe Liaison (SOCEUR LNO) who was located 
at the NATO Headquarters element.76 Although the numbers have dropped considerably 
since then, U.S. and NATO forces remain in Kosovo and have a persistent presence. 
Serbia continues to reject Kosovo‘s independence, but more than 60 countries now 
recognize Kosovo as a sovereign country.   
In contrast to a very small number of advisors sent to El Salvador, the entire 
governing body in Kosovo was taken over by the U.N. and a new governmental 
framework was built. As a result, one can say it was an outside party that decided what 
was in the best interests of Kosovars, an outside party that controlled every aspect of 
Kosovo’s day-to-day government.77 Even though Kosovo is considered a nation building 
success story, the Kosovo war, and involvement by NATO forces, cost the international 
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community billions of dollars and required sizeable numbers of resources and personal, 
to include both military and civilian personnel.  However, some nations regard NATO’s 
intervention an infringement on Serbia’s sovereignty.78 It also remains to be seen where 
the stability achieved in Kosovo will last after the total withdrawal of multi-national 
forces. While the Kosovo economy has improved, the country remains the poorest in 
Europe and unemployment remains high at nearly 40%.79 In sum, Kosovo can be said to 
represent a positive outcome for persistent presence.  However, the costs have also been 
extremely high with no clear exit in sight. The intervening power has remained a 
relatively large and ambiguously led multi-national conventional force. 
D. AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country that lies at the crossroads of many cultures 
and trade routes, connecting the Indian subcontinent with central Asia.  Because of its 
geographical location, empires have sought control over Afghanistan, from Cyrus and 
Alexander the Great, to Chingus Khan and Babur.  Because of these intrusions the people 
of Afghanistan can trace their lineage back to include the Persians, Greeks and Mongols.  
Today there are numerous ethnic groups in Afghanistan.  Over this long history, 
charismatic tribal leaders would often expand their territory only to succumb to tribal 
solidarity.80   
Afghanistan gained its independence from Britain in 1919, and was ruled by a 
series of monarchs between 1919 and 1973.  Zahir Shah ruling from 1933 until 1973.  
Most of his rule was marked by economic and educational advancement and relative 
stability in the country.  He achieved this by using his family members as prime ministers 
throughout the country.   From 1964-1973, Afghanistan saw a rise in the number of 
Marxist groups, and, in 1973, Sardar Muhammad Daoud Khan seized power.  Between 
1973 and 1978 Afghanistan tried to play both sides of the table with the United States and 
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the Soviet Union, accepting financial aid and construction projects from both.81  This was 
one of the first significant interactions the United States had with Afghanistan.  The U.S. 
involved itself more to counter Soviet influence then to help the Afghans, and little of 
substance resulted.  In 1978, Daoud and his family were killed in a coup and the 
communist party took over the country.82    
In December 1979, the Soviet Union launched a full-scale invasion of 
Afghanistan to support the fledgling communist government.  Thus began a war that 
would tear the country apart and contribute to the downfall of the Soviet Union.  
Afghanistan was now caught in the Cold War battle between the Soviets and the United 
States.  Since the Soviets had moved beyond their post-war boundaries, the United States 
along with Saudi Arabia (because Afghanistan was a Muslim country being invaded by 
non-Muslims) were willing to help finance the mujahedeen resistance.83  Initially, this 
involvement was minimal.  However, as early as 1980 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
agents with the assistance of small numbers of Special Forces began to secretly train, 
equip, and support the mujahedeen.  By 1984, this effort was showing significant success; 
mujahedeen controlled 62 percent of the countryside and were inflicting significant 
casualties and damage on the Soviets.84  In 1986, the U.S. began supplying the 
mujahedeen through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with Stinger ground-
to-air missiles, as well as funding cross-border humanitarian assistance.85  Finally, in 
February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.  
With victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. no longer saw the need to continue spending large sums of money and 
allocating resources to Afghanistan.  Although U.S. policy still supported Afghan “self-
determination,” and despite Afghans’ continued need for humanitarian assistance, 
Congress drastically reduced its funding and the U.S. government as a whole no longer 
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rated Afghanistan a national security threat. It abandoned the mujahedeen and 
Afghanistan shortly after the Soviet withdrawal.86   
Several years of civil war then ensued, with the Taliban taking control of the 
country in 1996.  Although Afghans had proved successful at being able to get rid of 
foreign occupiers over the previous century and a half by making the country 
ungovernable, this strategy would eventually contribute to their demise. Led by Afghan 
Pashtuns trained in madrasas in Pakistan, the Taliban was an ideological movement.  
While the Taliban initially brought peace and security, their rough mixture of Salafi Islam 
and Pashtunwali was considered by many Afghans to be harsh and unforgiving.  The 
Taliban also allowed the terrorist group al Qaeda to operate within Afghanistan’s borders.  
It was from Afghanistan where Usama bin Laden issued his “A Declaration of Jihad” in 
1996.87  The Taliban remained in control until the United States invaded in October 2001 
following the attacks on September 11.  The U.S. has remained in Afghanistan until the 
present and has increased its number of troops significantly since the initial invasion.  
In sum, Afghanistan demonstrates a failure on the part of the United States to 
maintain a persistent presence.  After successfully assisting and advising the mujahedeen 
to defeat the Soviets the U.S. ultimately abandoned Afghanistan.  Afghanistan was taken 
over by ideological hardliners and plunged into even more chaos.  After the attacks of 
September 11, the U.S. was forced to re-engage.  Had the U.S. maintained a persistent 
presence with a small number of Special Forces soldiers and CIA operatives all along it is 
unlikely that the Taliban and thus al Qaeda would have had a sanctuary to train and plan 
for the attacks on the U.S. and the western world. 
E. ANALYSIS 
While every situation is different and must be evaluated individually, each of the 
three cases discussed offers many lessons the U.S. government could use when 
implementing a FID/FSA program with a host nation.  The most important lesson learned 
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is the importance of a persistent presence.  When the U.S. becomes involved in FID/FSA 
in another country either before or after hostilities have broken out it is incumbent on the 
U.S. to stay the course and maintain a presence in the country in order to help restore and 
preserve the peace and prevent the return of instability.   
A second lesson learned is that it is critical to tailor the mission to the country.  
There is no “cookie cutter” solution to a country’s problems.  What is instead important is 
to provide sound advice and allow the host nation to solve its own problems.  The U.S. 
should provide advisors and help set the conditions, but ultimately it is the host nation 
that should solve its own problems. 
A third lesson to be learned is the importance of a small footprint.  More times 
then not a small group of highly trained soldiers will be far more effective than a larger 
force at developing and maintaining a positive long term mission to restore a host 
nation’s stability. The smaller force will be much more cost effective in the eyes of 
Congress and the American taxpayer.  Additionally, the population will be less likely to 
regard the U.S. as an occupying force. 
A final takeaway is how important it is to have a National Strategy for the country 
(tailored down to the tactical level), with all levels of the mission working off the same 
sheet of music.  The strategic plan for the country not only has to benefit the U.S., but 
also the host nation and its people as well.  Only this will contribute to local stability.  
While there is no guarantee of success even if each of these key lessons is learned and 
implemented, the chances for success go up exponentially if they are. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NIGERIA 
A. LESSONS LEARNED RECAP 
The case studies presented in this thesis offer numerous lessons learned for future 
SFA/FID missions.  For our purposes, four lessons are significant.  The first lesson 
learned is the importance of a plan that includes persistent presence once a commitment 
has been made to a host nation.  Secondly, each mission must be tailored for the specific 
country.  Third, for economic reasons, and for continued U.S. support, the mission must 
be conducted with the smallest footprint possible of specially trained soldiers.  Finally, 
the plan for the mission must include a National Strategy that is filtered down to the 
tactical level and nested for the region of the world in which the country is located. 
B. CURRENT OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA 
The U.S. Secretary of State, on April 6, 2010, signed the “Framework for the 
Establishment of a Bilateral Commission Between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Republic of Nigeria.” The agreement between the 
two countries, reflected in this document, is to establish a high-level dialogue that 
promotes diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation.88 This framework 
demonstrates that the U.S. and Nigerian governments both recognize that cooperation is 
needed in the areas of economics, military, technical, commercial, and social 
development. Although a framework has been established, very little has been done at the 
grass roots level. For example, the international community, and most Nigerians, 
recognized the 2011 presidential election as the most credible election since the end of 
military rule 1999.89  This being said, violence and corruption remain part of the election 
system, as a handful of candidates and voters were killed in attempts to sway votes. Local  
 
                                                 
88  U.S. Department of State, “Framework for the Establishment of a Bilateral Commission Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Nigeria.” 
(Washington DC: April, 2010) accessed 17 April, 2011 from http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ni/139598.htm. 
89  “Nigeria’s Successful Election: Democracy 1, Vote-Rigging 0,” The Economist  399, no. 8729 
(London: April 16–22, 2011),  14. 
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security forces often do not have sufficient incentive to protect the democratic process, as 
police chiefs are part of the political elite and stand to gain kickbacks from corrupt 
politicians.90  
Currently, military cooperation and training between the United States and 
Nigeria is limited to the occasional Nigerian officer attending military training and 
schools in the United States. U.S. Naval ships make port calls in Nigeria, as well as 
provide a presence in the Gulf of Guinea.  With U.S. forces engaged in different parts of 
Africa, as well as the rest of the world, forces that might be utilized for military-to-
military training are not currently prioritized for Nigeria. 
C. ADDRESSING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can the U.S. help prevent Nigeria from becoming a failed state? From the 
outset, and still today, a significant gap exists in Nigeria between the needs of society and 
the goals of the state. This is evidenced by the rapid succession of military coups, a civil 
war, and continued violence that is taking place in both the north and delta regions of the 
country.91   
In the Niger Delta, greed, pollution, and the deflation of the Nigerian naira (local 
currency) have led to the development of insurgent organizations such as MEND. 
MEND, in turn, has caused significant damage to the petroleum industry, one of the only 
income producing industries left in Nigeria.92 Agriculture, which holds great potential for 
Nigerian primacy in Africa,93 has suffered from pollution and the effects of ‘Dutch 
Disease’ leading to over-urbanization and poverty throughout the rest of Nigeria.94  
 
 
                                                 
90  “Nigerian Elections: Ballots and Bullets,” The Economist 399, no. 8729 (London: April 16–22, 
2011),  52. 
91 Udogu, “Liberal Democracy and Federalism in Contemporary Politics,”  333. 
92 Watts, Curse of The Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in the Niger Delta,  25. 
93  Seye Adeniyi, “Nigeria Has Potential to Feed its Citizens and Others but… “ Nigerian Tribune, 15 
March 2011, Retrieved 21 April 2011, from http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/agriculture/18878-
nigeria-has-potential-to-feed-its-citizens-and-others-but. 
94 Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, “Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria.” 
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Urbanization and relocation, due to the search for employment, has led to greater contact 
between Muslim and Christian communities that were previously more rigidly 
contained.95  
In Northern Nigeria, outside influences from Sunni and Shia countries, as well as 
AQIM, are exacerbating the existing fissures between Muslims and Christians.96 Laws 
that are not respected or enforced equally across societies work well when those societies 
are segregated, but they are perceived as unfair and degrading when society is mixed.97 
Perceived unfair treatment and lack of governmental support has led both Muslims and 
Christians to take actions against one another.  
In order to close the state/society gap, the Nigerian government must start 
addressing each of the significant social fissures that has been discussed thus far.  
Helping Nigeria develop the ability to provide and sustain security, in addition to 
establishing and developing civic programs through the training of military, police, and 
civic leaders, will assist with improving governance. Good governance, in turn, will assist 
Nigeria in eliminating the ability of AQIM, Boka Harim and MEND to gain a foothold 
with the Nigerian people. Once outside influences, corruption, and major pollution issues 
are corrected, Nigeria stands to become Africa’s strongest and most influential country, 
economically and politically.  
Nigeria must address what it means to be Nigerian currently.  From the local level 
up to the top, in both the government and civilian sectors, Nigeria must go through a 
rebranding of its national psyche.  Today there are many groups inside the borders of 
Nigeria, but very few Nigerians.  Instead, residents of the country identify themselves as 
Christians or Muslims, or as members of one of the 122 different tribes, but not 
necessarily as Nigerians.  For stability to endure, Nigerians must develop a common 
identity that all Nigerians can rally behind. 
                                                 
95 Barnes, “Christianity and the Colonial State in Northern Nigeria 1900–1960,   281. 
96 Jonathan N. C. Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria. 
97 Barnes, “Christianity and the Colonial State in Northern Nigeria 1900–1960.” 
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Presently, Nigeria is unable to unilaterally address the issues that are keeping it 
from being a successful African state, let alone a model state. Given security issues 
throughout Africa, the presence of Islamic extremist groups, and threats to vital natural 
resources, the U.S. must engage Nigeria in order to enable the Nigerian government to fix 
its problems. The “Framework for the Establishment of a Bilateral Commission Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Nigeria,” while a good start, is being executed at a level that is too high to be of real 
impact in the daily life of Nigerians.  
As we have learned from El Salvador, the impact of a few, highly coordinated and 
well-placed, advisors could have a significant impact in Nigeria on a national and 
international level. Understanding that Nigeria is significantly larger than Kosovo and El 
Salvador,  lessons learned by the international community in Kosovo and El Salvador 
suggest that persistent and highly focused training and advising, over a long period of 
time, may help Nigeria be able to eliminate most of its  problems. It is safe to assume that 
persistent presence in Nigeria must be a long-term commitment by the United States. 
With that being said, the following recommendations are made for the establishment of a 
long term, persistent plan that would enable U.S. planners and decision makers to assist 
Nigeria to become a leader in Africa. 
D. TSOC PLAN FOR NIGERIA  
One frustration for many inside U.S. Special Forces, and for the U.S. military in 
general, is a feeling of continually spinning our wheels and not gaining traction within 
countries where we are conducting mil-to-mil training. Training guidance usually comes 
in the form of some overarching generalization about a desired end state, such as ‘foster a 
stable environment’ or ‘develop partner forces.’  The country team usually interprets this 
guidance as, ‘conduct small unit tactics’ with the country’s more elite forces. Without 
any real guidance, or historical knowledge of past training, teams (different teams every 
iteration) usually conduct the same basic training, with the same partner force, year after 
year. In countries like Nigeria, where it is in the U.S.’s vital interest to develop stability, 
there should be a structure that helps do that by providing continuity not just in terms of 
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guidance and oversight but of personnel as well.  Given the plan we have developed, we 
recognize that many branches of the U.S. government, as well as non-government 
organizations, must participate in the effort in order to increase the likelihood of success, 
but for the sake of this thesis we will discuss the military aspect only.   
As a basis for the TSOC plan for Nigeria it is important to address several 
questions.  At each level: what are the individuals or units trying to accomplish, and why 
are they trying to accomplish it?  This must be assessed from both the U.S. and Nigerian 
perspectives.  At each level, advisors must convey the same overall message to their 
counterparts.  As mentioned above, the importance of Nigerian nationalism is a key 
theme that must be reinforced. Nigerians at all levels must understand that they are 
working for the same country, with the same goals, and that the overriding goal is 
Nigerian stability.  In addition to addressing the ‘what’ and ‘why,’ the plan must be built 
to withstand (or last over) multiple rotations. We have attached a sample rotation 
calendar with some key tasks to be met. We have started with a 3-year rotation calendar 
that, once implemented, will become a living document, and can be expected to evolve as 
time progresses and conditions on the ground change. 
A Special Forces Colonel—specifically Special Operations Command Africa 
Liaison Officer (SOCAFR LNO)—should be assigned to work directly with Nigerian and 
U.S. officials to develop a national strategy and a campaign plan for Nigeria that 
addresses issues based on Nigeria’s needs, and that are not biased toward the region from 
which senior officials hail. The SF Colonel would be the senior ranking officer in 
Nigeria.  His role will be to work with the Ambassador, the Ambassador’s staff, the 
(already established) Defense Attaché Office, the Nigerian government, SOCAFR/Joint 
Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF-TS), and the (newly developed) Special 
Operations Task Force-Nigeria (SOTF-N). He will not, however, be in the chain of 
command for SOTF-N.  The relationship between this LNO and SOTF-N will be one of 
mutual support that consists of coordination and working together to fulfill the mission 
objectives.  
Although this mission overall will be driven form the bottom-up, the SOCAFR 
LNO must help develop a campaign plan that includes key messages and themes, such as 
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the promotion of Nigerian nationalism.  He must allow the Nigerians to develop their 
own messaging that U.S. personnel can emphasize when working with Nigerians at all 
levels.  Ensuring that the campaign plan is disseminated down to the ODA level will 
ensure the Nigerian security forces receive the same message across the board. Continued 
communication up and down, and down and up, is paramount for success.  Without a 
solid plan that is reinforced at all levels, making true progress will be difficult. 
A Special Forces Battalion will act as SOTF-N headquarters and have 
responsibility for Nigerian SFA/FID on a two-year rotational basis that includes, as 
needed, National Guard Battalions. An Advanced Operating Base (AOB) and at least 
three Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) and one SEAL platoon 
(PLT) will maintain a persistent presence; the AOB will conduct a one-year rotation.  The 
AOB will be supported, as necessary, from SOTF-N personnel who will also perform a 1-
year rotation.  Initially, SFODAs/SEAL Platoons will conduct six-month rotations. 
The mission of SOTF-N will be to conduct SFA/FID in order to promote the long-
term stability of Nigeria.  SOTF-N will help set the conditions whereby the Nigerian 
security forces can train and gain experience at military and civilian security operations 
by helping them build their capacity.  The increased training and resourcing will help to 
deter further aggression from hostile organizations toward the Nigerian government.  The 
end-state will be to eliminate the threat of hostile organizations and set the conditions for 
long-term stability in Nigeria, and the region, by increasing security and the legitimacy of 
the Nigerian government.  
To achieve success, it is important that the teams are spread throughout the entire 
country starting with the first rotation.  ODAs and/or SEAL PLTs should be evenly 
dispersed to different regions of Nigeria.  As with the Kosovo model, each team would 
split into two or three-man teams to cover their region to the fullest extent possible. Team 
leaders would be responsible for making sure that each two or three-man split team 
conducts training, evaluation, and advising of Nigerian battalions based on the national 
plan. By doing this, the Nigerian forces would receive equal training throughout the 
country, dispensing with any myth that more support was focused on one particular 
region or one particular group. An example would be two ODAs in the Muslim north and 
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one ODA and one SEAL PLT in the Christian south and the Niger Delta.  This will 
minimize any perception of one tribe, religion, or geographic location being more 
important than another. Furthermore, splitting the teams into two or three-man teams will 
ensure training and capabilities are spread to maximize results, as well as disseminate the 
National Plan to the lowest level. Nigerian battalions from the south could conduct 
training and operations with those from the north, building unity and a sense of ‘Nigeria.’  
New teams would replace ODAs/SEAL PLTs on a six-month cycle with an overlap to 
ensure continuity. The ODAs/SEAL PLTs would report to the AOB who would 
coordinate the training effort throughout each region.  
The AOB would act as the Special Operations Command and Control Element 
(SOCCE) and would ensure that ODAs/SEAL PLTs were dispersed for maximum 
effectiveness. The AOB would be able to shift focus from one area to another based on 
the needs of the Nigerian forces as a whole. The AOB would be responsible for 
maintaining the institutional knowledge that facilitates sustaining training levels as 
ODAs/SEAL PLTs replace each other. The AOB would conduct a one-year mission and 
the continuity and turnover would be controlled by the SOTF-N. The AOB would also be 
responsible for conducting training and assessment of the regional and brigade level 
staffs, ensuring the national plan is the focus of their training.  
SOTF-N would be centrally located with the Nigerian general staff, and have 
overall responsibility to ensure that training conducted by the ODAs/SEAL PLTs, AOB 
and SOTF-N have the same national focus. SOTF-N would ensure that the focus is based 
on a Nigerian developed plan and would be responsible for advice about that plan based 
on the guidance from Nigerian national decision makers. A Special Forces Battalion 
would be responsible for SOTF-N on a two-year rotation, and would deploy and staff the 
SOTF-N as needed to ensure continuity of focus and training. SOTF-N would have 
overall responsibility for the U.S.’s persistent presence throughout Nigeria.  
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Figure 2.   Proposed Nigeria FSA/FID Organization Chart 
The mission of SOTF-N will be to conduct SFA/FID in order to promote the long-
term stability of Nigeria. Long-term stability for Nigeria is in the best interests of the U.S. 
In order to achieve this, the needs and the goals of the state must begin to align with the 
needs of society. Currently, Nigeria is a conglomeration of many tribes and the incentive 
to participate in public service is too often to further oneself or one’s tribe. Long-term 
partnership between U.S. Special Forces and the Nigerian forces will develop a national 
focus at all levels, from the local battalion to the national decision makers. This can be 
done through a variety of means, such as instilling the importance of Nigerian 
nationalism and the rule of law.  With less focus on what individuals might be doing to 
promote themselves or their tribes, the military can focus on anti-corruption and security 
threats, enabling Nigeria to develop to its full potential. A less corrupt, more productive 
Nigeria is vital to the rest of Africa and the world economy.  
To conduct this mission the plan will have multiple phases.  During Phase I, 
which includes the initial deployments, assessments, and refinement of a long-term 
engagement plan, the SOCAFR-LNO will make initial assessments and work in 
conjunction with the U.S. Embassy staff and Nigerian commanding generals to develop  
a national theme and plan. SOTF-N and the AOB will conduct initial assessments of their 
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respective Nigerian command levels, as well as make initial assessments as to the 
location of ODA/SEAL PLTs. During this phase, the ODA/SEAL PLTs will conduct 
detailed assessments of local military battalions to determine their level of training, 
training shortfalls, local focus, and logistics needs in order to provide long-term advising. 
They will also determine the split team plan to ensure two or three-man teams are paired 
with the correct Nigerian battalions.  
Phase II will begin upon completion of the Phase I assessments, after the plan has 
been refined to set realistic expectations, and after the rotation cycle is updated. The 
SOCAFR-LNO will continue to encourage and focus development of the Nigerian 
national plan and ensure that this focus is spread to the lowest level of the Nigerian 
security forces by means of U.S. advisors at each level. SOTF-N and the AOB will 
continue to advise the Nigerian leadership and develop staff functions to ensure the 
national plan is met. ODA/SEAL PLTs will conduct detailed training based on the needs 
and levels of competence for their respective Nigerian battalions. Each ODA/SEAL PLT 
leadership will monitor training plans and ensure the two–three man split teams are 
promoting the National Plan. During Phase II SOTF-N will be responsible for developing 
a rotation cycle for the AOB and ODA/SEAL PLTs that ensures persistent presence and 
continued progressive training.  
Phase III will begin when a second SOTF-N takes over from the initial SOTF-N, 
continuing to maintain a persistent presence in Nigeria, building on the previous 
rotation’s successes.  This is critical  to ensuring a persistent presence is maintained.  See 
Figure 3 for key tasks. 
To help ensure success, as mentioned above, the entire Nigerian strategy must be 
synchronized and resourced from the bottom-up by both the U.S. government and the 
Nigerian government.  Members of the country team must work with the SOCAFR LNO 
and SOTF-N to develop a comprehensive national strategy.  SOTF-N would also be 
responsible for advising the Nigerian military at the national staff level. The AOB would 
advise the military staff at the Ministerial/Brigade levels, and the SFODAs and SEAL 
PLTs would be responsible for advising at the tactical level. Many smaller nations’ 
militaries have difficulty sharing information up and down the chain of command, from 
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the local level to the national level. It is important that every level, from the SOCAFR 
LNO to the ODA, is working with the same information and strategy; this includes 
encouraging the Nigerians to do the same.  At the end of the day, Nigeria being able to 
stabilize itself and its sub-region is a Nigerian issue, and must be solved by Nigerians, but 
the United States has a vested interest in  helping set the conditions for  the Nigerians to 
accomplish this. 
 
Unit 1st Year Key Tasks 2nd Year Key Tasks 3rd Year Key Tasks 
SOCAFR LNO Campaign Planning  
National Level Advisor 
Theme Development 
 
Campaign Planning  
National Level Advisor 
Theme Development 
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SOTF-N Campaign Planning  
National Level Military 
Advising 
Senior Staff Advising 
Campaign Planning  
National Level Military 
Advising 
Senior Staff Advising 
Campaign Planning  
National Level Military 
Advising 
Senior Staff Advising 




















ODA/SEAL PLT Unit Assessments 
Small Unit Tactical 
Training 
Unit Level Advising 
Local Gov’t Advising 
Battalion Level Staff 
Planning 
Small Unit Tactical 
Training 
Unit Level Advising 
Local Gov’t Advising 
Leadership (Officers & 
NCOs) Development 
Battalion Level Staff 
Planning 
Small Unit Tactical 
Training 
Unit Level Advising 
Local Gov’t Advising 
Leadership (Officers & 
NCOs) Development 
Figure 3.   Three-Year Rotation Calendar – Key Tasks  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Nigeria’s stability is not simply a Nigerian matter. The U.S. must look at the role 
that Nigeria plays in Africa and the effects that it has on the continent, as well as the rest 
of the world. Nigeria is potentially the influential country in Africa; one of every six 
Africans lives in Nigeria; one out of every four Africans is a Nigerian.98  The only limit 
on Nigeria’s ability to develop its natural resources, to include natural gas, oil and its 
diverse population are the limits it places on itself.  Yet, the consequences of a non-stable 
Nigeria can affect the entire globe. In addition to fuel, Nigeria’s natural resources of land 
and water enable it to potentially provide food to the rest of the continent. Located 
centrally in Africa, on the fringe between the northern Sahel and the vast Sub-Saharan 
region, Nigeria is positioned to influence the entire continent. It is this combination of 
diversity and geographical positioning that situates Nigeria as a central power of 
influence in Africa. 
For Nigeria to succeed there must be stability. As mentioned earlier, there are 
many factors contributing to concerns about Nigeria. The existence of Islamist groups in 
northern Nigeria, to include Boko Haram’s connection to AQIM, MEND in the Niger 
Delta, 36 years of military rule, as well as persistent corruption in the government, has 
left many ordinary Nigerians (Muslim and Christian alike) convinced that protest and 
public disorder are the only way to be heard. In addition, the manner in which Nigeria 
was developed into a country has not left it a firm national identity. This lack of national 
identity has enabled significant tensions to flourish, and has also contributed to a lack of 
trust in government throughout the country. 
With all that is transpiring throughout northern Africa, it is incumbent that the 
U.S. makes Nigeria a priority to help prevent it from succumbing to destabilization.  One 
solution to Nigeria’s stability problem is to support a persistent U.S. presence in the 
country. This presence could be focused to help Nigeria develop a national identity. 
Nigeria has shown a willingness to fix its problems; the persistent presence of advisors 
                                                 
98 Kenny Okey Iwunna, “Peace Through Development in Nigeria and Rest of Africa” USAfrica 
Online, accessed 6 May 2011, http://usafricaonline.com/peacedev.keniwunwa.html. 
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would enable the country to develop answers to its own problems, but under an 
interested, yet impartial cadre. The case studies examined in this thesis offered examples 
of both success and failure in U.S. efforts at stabilization. The most cost-efficient and 
effective means to develop and help sustain a stable nation is through small, well-
organized teams of long-term advisors who can encourage the host nation to develop its 
own methods. 
The results of our analysis revealed four major themes to consider when 
developing a strategy for Nigeria. 1) The plan must include a long-term, persistent 
presence once a commitment has been made. 2) The mission must be tailored for Nigeria. 
3) For economic reasons, and to facilitate continued U.S. support, the mission must be 
conducted with a reasonably small footprint of specially trained soldiers. 4) The plan for 
the mission must include a National Strategy that is filtered down to the tactical level and 
nested within a broader plan to support stability in that region of the world in which the 
country is located. We have proposed a plan for Nigeria that, if implemented, will go a 
long way in instituting stability in Nigeria. 
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